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BECOMING EXPERIENCED IN TEACHING AND LEARNING

What constitutes becoming experienced
in teaching and learning?*

The primary task for teacher education then becomes to help prospective
teachers be in touch, intimately related with the processes of actual experi‐
ence, such that they learn to be open to their experience, to be radically un‐
dogmatic—in touch with self, others, and the character of the circumstances
in which they find themselves.
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Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to address one of the central questions for teachers
and teaching: how is it that teachers are able to see and act appropriately in
concrete circumstances? To do so, we examine the ontological meaning of
experience in teacher education. The discussion is anchored in the concrete
particulars of a grade 5 art lesson. Our intent is to show the dynamic proc‐
esses involved in becoming experienced as a teacher and to draw connections
between experience and practical wisdom (phronesis). Thus, we argue that
phronesis is not so much a form of knowledge as it is dynamic experience.
We argue for the development of what John Dewey called educational ex‐
perience in teacher education, and in particular its dynamic edge: the making
of wise and practical judgments. We assert that such action is made possible,
not so much by translating (unsituated) theory into practice through the de‐
ployment of specialized technique, or by inducing general, abstract proposi‐
tions from concrete particulars, but primarily from being mindfully embodied.

* Published in Teaching and Teacher Education 17 (2001), pp. 885‐895.
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Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S0742‐051X(01)00038‐5. Used by permission.
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Every experience worthy of the name thwarts a previous
expectation (Gadamer, 1996, p. 364)
Few educators would argue with the assertion that the primary
purpose of student teaching is to have students become experienced
as teachers. What could be more obvious? However, when it is time
to decide what “becoming experienced” means, both practically and
philosophically, we find it to be the source of considerable difficulty
and disagreement, with our colleagues, our students, and the practi‐
tioners with whom we work in the field. So what counts as experi‐
ence? Mastering subject matter? Building a repertoire of teaching
strategies? Developing the concrete skills of teaching like planning
lessons, managing classrooms and deploying elaborate, “objective”
assessment schemes? If you asked many of our colleagues, our stu‐
dents and the teachers we work with, the answer would probably be
yes to all of the above questions, and this is the source of our concern.
It would seem, that of the three kinds of knowledge identified by
Aristotle (1925)—techne, episteme, and phronesis—the first two, techni‐
cal knowledge and theoretical knowledge, predominate in these no‐
tions of experience, with theory running a distant second and
phronesis or practical wisdom neglected or negated all together. But
why should we find this troubling? Does it matter that the education
of our students is driven by a model of applied science? What if, as
Britzman (1991) notes, we treat student teaching primarily as an op‐
portunity for students to “gain command of the necessary tools of
2
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their profession; control of the technique of class instruction and
management; skill and proficiency in the work of teaching” (p. 9)? Is
this not what learning to teach is all about? The trouble is that the an‐
swer to this question is, in part, yes. We do not wish to deny the im‐
portance of tool use or skill acquisition in teaching, nor do we want to
dismiss methods and techniques. It is not that techne is an invalid or
inappropriate form of knowledge for teaching: who can argue with
the need for craft in teaching? But an exclusive focus on techne
squeezes out the self in teaching—the “who” is sidelined and silenced
by the “what”. One no longer has a language available to talk about
making good judgments, developing character or the meaning of ex‐
perience. And the fragmentation and isolated specialization that is
the earmark of technical rationality produces a form of incoherent
hyper‐activity that is all too familiar in Faculties of Education and
schools.
Thus we agree with Dewey (1904) that too strong and too early an
emphasis on skill and technique can be detrimental to the develop‐
ment of a teacher, sacrificing later growth (of mind and spirit) for the
quick blush of technical competence.
It might be argued that few teacher education programs would
adhere strictly to teaching technique; most at least make a cursory
attempt to impart abstract knowledge to their students. But focusing
on theory does not allow us to escape the prison of language we get
lured into with technique either. Kessels and Korthagen (1996) point
out that abstract teaching theories:

This is why we think that the notion of phronesis, practical wis‐
dom, addresses this need and is a more compelling way to think
about what counts as experience in teacher education. Through trac‐
ing out the contours of experience, revealing its complicacy with
phronesis, we find that phronesis is not really a form of knowledge,
but what Dewey calls educational experience. We believe, as Dewey
(1938) and Gadamer (1996) claim, that knowledge should be con‐
ceived of in terms of experience and process rather than as a “thing”
that accumulates, or simply as a means to a higher end. We also hope
to show how theory and practice can be intertwined through and by
experience, thoughtfully responsive to concrete circumstances, as‐
suming a fundamental ontological relationship between self and
other.
To do this we will ground this inquiry in a grade 5 art lesson
taught by one of our second‐year student teachers, a young woman
we will call Christine. We selected this particular instance from a set
of interviews we did with 4 education students following completion
of the first year of a two‐year post‐degree teacher preparation pro‐
gram. All of the students had been taught by one of the researchers in
the previous year. They volunteered for the study to talk about what
had precipitated out of their experience in terms of important learn‐
ing, and what had both helped and hindered their preparation to
teach. They were not all wildly successful in our program—one has
since dropped out, and two others came close to choosing other ca‐
reer paths—but all were thoughtful, insightful and candid. We
thought that they could help us better understand our “good inten‐
tions”, and they were looking to better understand their own experi‐
ence. The instance chosen was not selected to illustrate how inexperi‐
enced our student teachers are, or how, through expert and benevo‐
lent guidance, things might have been otherwise. Rather, we will ar‐
gue that the possibility of becoming more experienced arises only
when something happens to us beyond what we anticipate. Thus, we
do not view any part of the lesson described below as a mistake that
somehow should have been avoided. Instead, we think of it as a
compelling example of how we all might deepen our understanding
of pedagogy.

lack flesh and blood in a very literal sense; they do not have a
face, nor a repertoire of actions. They have no temperament, no
personal characteristics, no history, no vices, and no virtues.
They cannot be seen in action, nor talked to, nor criticized nor
admired. In short, they have no perceptual reality; they are just
concepts, abstractions. Therefore, they cannot be identified with.
(p. 21)
At least within the frame of conventional science, episteme and
techne both are essentially “worldless”—time, place, events, human
actions, relationships and experience have been stripped from these
forms of knowledge—they are disembodied epiphenomenon.
3
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What follows occurred near the beginning of Christine’s third‐term
practicum. Her intent was to introduce a unit of study regarding the
Renaissance. She wanted students to gain a greater understanding of
the relationship between historical contexts and art making. She
hoped that her introductory lesson would engage students in a
thought‐provoking discussion of lifestyles, artists, and artworks of
the Renaissance. According to the instructors’ field notes (16/12/99),
Christine’s journal entries, our reconstructive conversation with her,
and subsequent drafting and re‐drafting of this account, her lesson,
told from the researcher’s perspective, proceeded as follows:

how a rich banker requested that da Vinci paint a picture of his
wife, Mona Lisa, but upon completion refused to pay because
he did not like the outcome, da Vinci, on the other hand, was
very fond of the painting, carried it around with him and died
with it close at hand. The students appear spellbound by Chris‐
tine’s account and join in the discussion, commenting on the
mood of the painting of Mona Lisa, her dress, and lifestyle. Ex‐
citement and energy blossoms quickly in the class, discussion
ranges from re‐creating of Renaissance times to wondering
about the life, times, and works of Leonardo da Vinci. Amidst
this rich, alive discussion Christine abruptly asks students to
return to their tables and copy prepared notes from the over‐
head projector into their sketchbooks for the remaining class
time. Students return to their tables reasonably quickly, how‐
ever they seem reluctant to begin copying the notes. Christine
reiterates her directive several times as she walks between the
tables monitoring student activity closely. As the class comes to
an end not everyone has finished taking notes. The bell rings
and students make their way out of the classroom.

As students enter the art room Christine asks them to leave all
books and materials at the tables and to gather their chairs
tightly around her at the front of the room. The students re‐
spond quickly, and when they have settled Christine opens the
discussion with the question: Has anyone heard the term. Ren‐
aissance? Many students respond affirmatively, by volunteering
individual interpretations, and Christine embellishes these by
recounting the central concerns of this time period: rebirth, the
onset of modern times, a particular regard for anatomical and
life‐like artworks. She then asks students to walk imaginatively
back through time to the Renaissance. To help them do this, she
asks them to name appropriate discoveries, typical dress, key
events, and common pastimes of the different eras. When they
reach the 1600s, Christine has student volunteers read aloud
from prepared scripts, describing what a day in Renaissance life
might be like for a working class boy, a working class girl, a
wealthy boy, a wealthy girl, a patron, and a young art student.
As the students do this, Christine displays pictures depicting
Renaissance times. She then asks them to brainstorm further
ideas around clothing, work, transportation and technology.
Following this, Christine poses the question, how it is that we
know some of this information, and suggests that the many
great works of art created at the time tell us about life during
the Renaissance. Christine shows a few pictures of the works of
Donatello, Michelangelo, Raphael, and da Vinci and provides
interesting facts about each artist. For example, she conveys

A standard evaluation of Christine’s lesson, employing a check list
of “knowledge, skills and attributes” would reveal that she had
clearly stated objectives, an engaging introduction, good pacing, a
tidy conclusion and excellent timing. In addition, she used a variety
of teaching strategies, monitored student activity, established a cli‐
mate of mutual respect, used her voice and mannerisms effectively,
and incorporated visual aids into the lesson to increase motivation.
Such evaluations are commonplace in teacher education. They tell us
what to look for when we observe, form the bases for our feedback to
students, and serve as descriptors of learning to teach. Using such a
checklist enables us to say that Christine has acquired many of the
concrete skills of teaching, that her conduct is smooth and efficient—
quite a set of accomplishments for a beginning teacher.
But we are also keenly aware that such a checklist draws our at‐
tention away from what happened to Christine during the lesson,
that is, it flattens out and glosses over the eventful character other
experience. And so we ask, as Barone (1998) has: ‘To what extent has
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the ability to see subtle and important nuances in teaching episodes
been blunted by a habit of merely recognizing that which is pointed
to by standardized evaluation checklists?” (p. 1120). Christine’s con‐
versation with us following her lesson offers a glimpse of the intel‐
lectual life that surges beneath the smooth surface of our checklists
and scientific instruments.

fully embodied way, she is able to make discoveries, to learn from
these, and begin the vital, living process of sensitive adjustment that
we think is so essential to genuine teaching experience.
In this next instance, where Christine meets the concrete realities of
the classroom, we can see the continuation of the dynamic interplay
she began in her preparation. She recalls:

1. Re‐tracing the lived contours of experience
For Christine, lesson preparation involves recovering the living
landscape that she is corporeally or sensorially embedded in, playing
with the concrete particulars other situation as possibilities, in order to
understand, not in the usual sense of the word, meaning to grasp
mentally or deduce from information received, but rather in a bodily
sense of making sound judgments. Note Christine’s words:
As I rehearsed the lesson in my mind in advance I discovered
that reading the story was going to feel way too long. I knew I
needed to find ways to get the students more deliberately in‐
volved. I needed to find ways to get them to shift from listening
to role‐playing, to looking, to guessing, and so on. I made these
changes before I actually taught the lesson.

This was the fourth time I had done this lesson ... I was a lot
more relaxed ... letting things go a bit and not focusing on
wrapping each part up so tightly ... I started to give students
more power to talk about things relevant and obviously impor‐
tant to them. I felt more comfortable letting the discussion be
longer and fuller as I repeated the lesson ... I was really sur‐
prised and excited about how much understanding the children
already had about art in general and painters; some quite well
thought through. Had I really understood this I would have
built on this more. I would have encouraged them to tell me the
story behind the paintings.

Through her rehearsal, Christine begins to develop a feel for and a
sense of how her lesson might go: a carnal, embodied understanding
of how the different collective patterns of action play themselves out
in her specific situation. We might say that Christine is playing
imaginatively with concrete particulars. By imagination we do not
mean some mental faculty, or the ability to engage in the free play of
ideas in one’s mind, but rather as something that is integral to action
in the first place, that is, “the way the senses throw themselves be‐
yond what is immediately given, in order to make tentative contact
with the other sides of things that we do not sense directly, the hid‐
den or invisible aspects of the sensible” (Abrams, 1996, p. 58). Such
imaginative play allows Christine to develop a “sense of immediacy,
of vivid, sensuous experience that we associate with the world we
fling ourselves toward” (Grumet, 1991, p. 85). Engaged in this mind‐

For us, three things are of note here. First, as Christine begins to
submit to what is happening in the lesson, she is surprised by what
unfolds. Something new happens in the lesson, something that was not
simply there in the lesson plan, the subject matter or the materials she
had assembled beforehand. This we feel is an important clue to un‐
derstanding what constitutes genuine experience: it necessarily en‐
tails novelty. Second, Christine has the distinct sense of having un‐
dergone something. As Heidegger (1971) notes “When we talk of un‐
dergoing an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is
not exactly of our own making; to undergo here means that we en‐
dure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this
something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens” (p. 57).
Third, “having an experience means that we change our minds, reori‐
ent and reconcile ourselves to a new situation” (Weinsheimer, 1985, p.
203). Experience has a physical dimension, it involves re‐turning and
re‐lating to ones circumstances differently. Experience is not simply
an episode of life that one remembers through an act of recall, or a
serial chain of episodes that slowly accumulate like years. What
makes an experience stand out from the flux of life is that something
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in particular happens that surprises us and through this, if we take
what happens seriously, transforms us. In other words experience re‐
members us, requires us to be a different person in a different place.
This is why genuine experience connotes a sense of adventure, “an
adventure which interrupts the customary courses of events and is
related to the context it interrupts” (Risser, 1997, p. 84–85). One ven‐
tures forth to undergo something, and through this undergoing is
transformed, that is, one returns from experience as a different person.
Such transformation is not simply a change in individual conscious‐
ness, but rather represents a change in collective action (a rupture of
the status quo, of routine procedure) with all participants experienc‐
ing transformation.
It is not that Christine’s lesson is unstructured, like the unpat‐
terned wheeling and spinning of chaotic, mindless activity that peo‐
ple often associate with images of flux and change in classrooms.
There is structure to what she does, but it is not simply there, as an
external feature, like the hard shell of a crab or a metal frame. Rather,
it exists more like the structure of a conversation, unfolding from the
process of engagement, a process of structuring and restructuring the
events of the lesson with her students. Structure here is more like a
verb than it is a noun—it emerges within the development of the
learning experience itself. The purpose for and content of learning
grows and takes shape through the interactions between students,
Christine, and subject matter. That is, the lesson is alive and vital. It is
this vitality that excites Christine and catches her up in the unfolding
narrative of collective action.
Another element of experience that we wish to articulate, hinted at
in the previous instances, has to do with its negative dimension, the
disappointment that one feels in what Gadamer (1996) calls “having
previous expectations thwarted”(p. 364). Having an experience is not
simply confirming and celebrating what one already knows and un‐
derstands, nor is it the Disney‐esque or romantic, “Grand Tourist”
version of adventure or being there. Rather, it involves an element of
suffering, of “shattering an accustomed way of life” (Risser, 1997, p.
90). Again, we return to Christine’s lesson, to her decision to do what
was expected of her, i.e., to “bring closure to her lesson”. The decision

to assign the note‐taking task is one that is preconceived: a call back
to routine and measurable order. Christine explains:

9

I planned to have them do the notes at the end of the class.
Notes were something that they always did. I felt it was some‐
thing they were used to, familiar with, and that the teacher
thought it was appropriate. It seemed to make sense, because
that was what was supposed to happen. I didn’t think about
anything other than that. The kids just groaned. You could just
see the physical change. The dynamics of the classroom
changed ... but I didn’t fully understand the difference ... it was
not as clear until you questioned me on it. And then it seemed
dead obvious. I had them in the palm of my hand and I
dropped them. We had this good rapport going and then I had
to walk around insisting everyone note take. Teaching changed
to just managing them. I don’t know what I was teaching them
... just to be quiet and be on task ... I did feel a pressure, respon‐
sibility, to follow patterns in place. I did not question it. I also
panicked a little as I felt like so much had opened up asking me
to reconsider over and over again. Suddenly, I guess I felt un‐
comfortable.
We want to assert that the disappointment she feels, the negativity
that emerges is part of the process of becoming experienced. Experi‐
ence is better thought of as that which works against knowledge; a
process of undercutting it, of questioning what was previously taken
for granted. But the destructive force of experience is paradoxically a
positive phenomenon. It does not result in despair or disarray, but
rather in new understanding that yields insight. As Christine recalls:
Several weeks later (when I was teaching 100%) during a grade
8 lesson, I realized halfway through that it was not working. I
felt comfortable to abandon [the lesson] and move on. It was not
note taking, but something along that line and I thought to my‐
self—it is not important. The reaction from the class caused me
to make that decision. Something just clicked as I was teaching
... I thought they’ve got it, I do not need to go further with this
particular activity—it is not going to make a difference. In part
10
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this comfort came from the fact that I was by myself at that par‐
ticular moment. I felt confident. But, also, since the Mona Lisa
lesson I question myself on an ongoing basis more. I ask myself,
is it necessary?

cumstances of her lessons. Asking good questions, we feel, does not
arise from using taxonomies to promote “higher order thinking”, but
from feeling one’s way into the openness of experience, by seeing the
actual as one possibility among many and asking, as Christine has
done, “Is this worthwhile?”
Specific demands are made of Christine throughout these mo‐
ments as she perceives, selects, and responds, organizing and re‐or‐
ganizing the encounter. Ellsworth (1997) describes such interaction as
being in a place where the teacher “is never in full possession of her‐
self, of the students, or of the texts and meanings that she works
with” (p. 163). Christine can choose to enter such a space, but choos‐
ing to practice from this “in‐between” position is risky business,
fraught with the pushes and pulls of conflicting responsibilities.
Staying close to life in the classroom, not “taking the fast way out the
back door of the flux” (Caputo, 1988, p. 1), is difficult and at times
impossible to do. Note Christine’s sense of being uncomfortable and
her panic in the account above. Remember that her obligations to “the
patterns in place” had the particular effect of ending the fluid trans‐
action between her and the students. Memory, particularly in the
form of perceived responsibility, can bind individuals to a fixed past
and a frozen future. That is, it can thwart genuine experience.
We might say that in order to remember (differently), to be re‐
membered, Christine has to engage in what Nietzsche (1980) would
call “active forgetting”. It seems to us that the problem for Christine is
not one of denying what has been previously established, but of
learning to forget certain aspects of it, to clear a space to become
something other than her partner teacher. And it is not just Christine
that needs to forget, for if the students do not forget as well they will
respond as “habituated selves” and drag Christine back to the estab‐
lished way of doing things. It is new territory that needs to be opened
up, not just a change in individual perception or consciousness that
needs to happen. As Risser (1997) says, “In forgetfulness we make
room for new things”(p. 98). Educational experience then is not sim‐
ply a private psychological affair or an individual accomplishment,
but a collective undertaking, what Arendt (1958) would call action—
that which reveals our possibilities. So paradoxically, active forget‐
ting creates a space for us to re‐member what is possible for our stu‐

In this instance, Christine’s disappointment has led to hope—ex‐
pressed in her buoyant confidence to adjust her teaching to the
learning that unfolds during her lessons. We might say here that her
hope triumphs over her experience, just as her experience has led her
to disappointment. One follows the other in a never‐ending cycle, and
it is this process that Gadamer (1996) claims gives experience its fun‐
damental character. Thus experience (and a good lesson) does not
end in closure, but rather in openness:
A person who is called experienced has become so not only
through experience, but is also open to new experience. The con‐
summation of his [sic] experience ... does not consist in the fact
that someone already knows everything and knows better than
anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the
contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because
of the many experiences he [sic] has had ... is particularly well
equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them ...
experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowl‐
edge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by
experience itself. (Gadamer, 1996, p. 355)
Being open to experience does not mean being unbounded. It is
not so much being radically relative as it is being humble, not so
much an act of submission, as an act of recognition, always tied to the
particular. Christine signals her openness specifically, in her phrase “I
question myself on an ongoing basis”. Her questions have a sense of
direction. They are oriented towards some things and away from
other things; they are bounded by what she finds in the particular
situation, her intentions, and by what happens in the flow of specific
events—the result of paying careful attention to her circumstances.
Her openness does not mean that she just makes things up as she goes
along, but rather that she senses, through asking questions, the
openings or possibilities that present themselves in the concrete cir‐
11
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dents and ourselves. Without this function there would not be a way
for student teachers to break out of the routines they inherit when
they step into someone else’s classroom, no way to “bring into being
a higher freedom in which people realize and reveal themselves as
distinct and unique persons” (Dunne, 1993, p. 89). We do not wish to
suggest here that student teachers simply disregard the established
social order of someone else’s classroom, but we do find that, all too
often, procedurally entrenched routine, even in the form of “innova‐
tive practice”, forecloses on the possibility that something new might
happen, that a new self might emerge.
The living contours of experience as collective action—venturing
forth and returning from, undergoing and unfolding, being hopeful
and disappointed, accepting and questioning, being tentative and
confident, forgetting and remembering, and realizing a new self—
mark it as an embodied process of conjoint responsive adjustment.
The plurality and natality (Adrent, 1958) of experience make it uncer‐
tain and unpredictable. Becoming experienced cannot be conflated
with knowing how (procedural knowledge or techne) or knowing
that (conceptual knowledge or episteme), but is rather about under‐
standing “how to deal with the unexpected—indeed expecting it”
(Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 204). Christine discovers uncertainty to be
productive, indeed essential to the life of her lesson. For Christine,
becoming experienced transcends technical skill and conceptual
coding. It has to do with becoming perceptive and discerning, with
making appropriate decisions about what, or how much, when and in
what manner. Looking back, it is easy to see that the contours of ex‐
perience we have been describing are permeated with the practice of
making good judgments.

how much and with whom. Teaching necessarily involves choosing, and,
as Weinsheimer (1985) asserts, “The choice that is right cannot be de‐
termined in advance or apart from the particular situation, for the
situation itself partly determines what is right” (p. 190). Technical
knowledge and practical judgment share the central moment of
teaching—application. Both are practical in this way, and involve ac‐
tion. However, contrary to what is portrayed in the myriad of meth‐
ods, texts and courses available in teacher education, application is
not a simple matter of following a procedure, like a recipe, or of im‐
plementing scientifically derived principles, but rather is a matter of
attunement, that is, “perceiving what is at stake in a situation” (Ris‐
ser, 1997, p. 107). Technical knowledge does not change in any fun‐
damental way when it is acquired. Nor does it transform the person.
The skills of teaching, represented in the checklists which we com‐
monly use to observe our students are taken to be universal. One
gains proficiency in them largely through repetition—they are un‐
transformed by time and place, and they leave the self untouched.
Thus, it is possible to become skilled, but not experienced, to gain
competence but not wisdom. One can learn to make a classroom run
like a Swiss watch, to get children to willingly produce all kinds of
work, even to generate high scores on standardized exams, and still
not become experienced in Dewey’s terms.
Technical knowledge in education is apt to be about making things
or products, thus managing children through the efficient application
of method, from pre‐selected objectives through to fixed outcomes.
Practical (ethical) judgment, or phronesis, however:

2. Centering experience: being mindfully embodied

is an experiential phenomenon in which the means of acting
and the “product” [i.e., ethical being] occur simultaneously
within the situation itself. Hence, in contrast with techne, where
the means [the form and the materials of production] and the
ends [the finished work] are patently separate and distinguish‐
able, the means and ends of phronesis are both subsumed in ex‐
perience. (Coltman, 1998, p. 22)

As Kant (1952) pointed out over two hundred years ago, and as
every student teacher quickly finds out, there are no rules for the ap‐
plication of the rules. This is why technique is insufficient in teaching,
at least in good teaching, because we are simultaneously confronted
with the demand, not simply to know how, but to know when, and

Put another way, human lives are not made in the same way that
widgets are, students are not simply inanimate objects to be shaped
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into competent technologies that produce and perform, that is, they
are not simply “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1977) for our con‐
sumption or validation. As Britzman (1991) points out, “students are
persons who bring their own deep investments to education” (p. 211)
as do teachers. Ignoring, suppressing or abandoning subjectivity, that
is, how we are “corporeally embedded in a living landscape”
(Abrams, 1996, p. 65), will neither produce experience nor lead to les‐
sons that are alive and vital. Being attuned to a common field of col‐
lective action then, brings with it the ethical responsibility of engag‐
ing with students in “a joint project in which all take responsibility
for learning” (Wiltshire, 1986, p. 24). Joint projects are dependent
upon gaining insights into what matters to the participants. But in‐
sight by itself will not do. One must have the freedom and authority
to act upon what one sees and feels is important. Without this, as we
have noted all too often with our students, a kind of weary frustration
sets in. Christine, in this instance, was able to avoid this kind of futil‐
ity, the futility of simply being someone’s apprentice, because she
was given the opportunity to act in concert with her perceptions in
her practicum setting. She was not hauled back to an externally de‐
rived checklist of knowledge, skills and attitudes by her mentors, but
encouraged to play with ways to make deeper forays, with her stu‐
dents, into a living landscape of subject matter. Her authority was
carefully fostered by a partner teacher and a practicum advisor
working together primarily to help Christine relive and reinterpret her
experience, and not simply to help her time her lessons and manage
her students. Engaging Christine in a conversation oriented towards
her experience is different than having an instrumental exchange
with Christine aimed at bettering her performance in the most eco‐
nomical and efficient manner possible. Wisdom can be a frame for
taking up issues of technique, but the reverse is not true.
We wonder how many student teachers are encouraged to be
mindfully embodied in this way. We fear that all too often they are
pulled away from attending to the situation by the demands to per‐
form, manage, and execute smooth and unruffled lessons. If this is
the case, if one’s attention is focused on moving students efficiently
through lessons to predetermined ends, then one can hardly be ex‐
pected to be corporeally embedded in the dynamic flow of unfolding,

collective action. Techniques and strategies, if they are deployed for
purposes of performance can “fix” what needs to be lived through,
can as Caputo (1985) alluded to earlier provide a back door out of the
flux. Technically skilled teachers may produce well orchestrated be‐
havior, exquisitely timed transitions, neatly completed tasks, and
sparkling test scores but, at the same time, cut both student and
teacher off from a deep sense of engagement and being invested in
something worthwhile. We think this is why Dewey (1938) reminds
us that “a given experience may increase a person’s automatic skill in
a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; the
effect is to narrow the field of further experience” (p. 26). In his earlier
writing, Dewey (1904) is clear about what he means by “landing in a
groove or rut”, that is, “undue premature stress laid in early practice
work upon securing immediate capability in teaching” (p. 16).
Dewey proposes a teacher education program that we see as cen‐
tered on phronesis—the making of practical (moral) judgments. His
proposal places value on observation that draws student teachers’
attention towards initiating and sustaining learning involvement in
classrooms:
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The student should not be observing to find out how the good
teacher does it, in order to accumulate a store of methods by
which he also may teach successfully. He should rather observe
with reference to seeing the interaction of mind, to see how
teacher and pupil react to each other, how mind answers to
mind. (Dewey, 1904, p. 19)
He wants student teachers to be alert to the complexity implicit in
teaching and learning, to acknowledge both their own experience and
the particular character of the situation. His argument rests on
changing the meaning of what constitutes experience and becoming
experienced. He asks us to place ourselves at risk, to be courageous,
to ask the question that Christine posed earlier: “Is what we are en‐
gaged in worthwhile”? Given the crunch of practicum and the fre‐
netic pace of many classrooms, do we have the time, the place and the
intent to cultivate wisdom, or are we, in the name of ease and effi‐
ciency, investing solely in poesis—performance‐oriented instrumental
action?
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The ability to ground one’s teaching in experience seems depend‐
ent on developing the capacity to perceive and respond sensitively to
what is happening, to be aware of our circumstances; a knowing in‐
formed by place. Britzman (1991) distinguishes between mere circum‐
stance and the character of experience taken up throughout this pa‐
per. Her thoughts allude in our minds to a cautionary note that must
be heeded if teaching and learning is indeed to be grounded in ex‐
perience. Britzman points out that one’s capacity to participate in the
shaping of experience is limited if an awareness of potential and
given meanings is not cultivated along with a capacity to extend ex‐
perience through interpretation and risk (p. 34). It is this active en‐
gagement with circumstance that is critical towards a knowing in and
through experience. Such is the nature of phronesis, derived from the
act of participation itself. Thus, Christine’s account and Britzman’s
words caution that this knowledge ought not to be held in separate
pieces labeling it teacher thinking (e.g. Clark & Peterson, 1986; Shul‐
man, 1986), reflective practice (e.g. Schon, 1987), cognitive and moral
aspects of teacher development (e.g. Feiman‐Nemser, 1983; Ginsburg
& Clift, 1990; Zeichner & Gore, 1990), or relations between the per‐
sonal and teaching practice (Clark & Lampert, 1986; Cole, 1990; Con‐
nelly & Clandinin, 1988; Elbaz, 1988; Schwab, 1983). If knowledge is
individually held as a set of beliefs, values, images, pre‐understand‐
ings, or propositions about the way things work or ought to work,
knowledge is more apt to stand apart from the situation as some thing
that can be tested, listed, or known solely in conscious awareness, is it
not? Also, if knowledge is individually held, do not the individuals
themselves become abstracted forms—transformed into pure specta‐
tors of their own lives (Scott & Usher, 1996)? We fully acknowledge
the last two decades of such educational research evidencing a schol‐
arship particular to teacher education that significantly contributes to
a wider sense of what knowledge might be for students and teachers.
We are grateful to those writers for opening the discussion towards
considerations for teaching/learning experiences. However, we feel
this research does not go beyond recognizing that knowledge grows
from personal experience. How teachers might actually recognize,
develop, and sustain teaching/learning experiences tends to be ne‐
glected or reduced to descriptions of what is known and believed. As

Boisvert (1998) reiterates, discussing Dewey’s (1938) notion of experi‐
ence:
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Knowledge is not an affair of coming directly into the presence
of the really real once and for all. Knowing is temporally condi‐
tioned. It grows with the varying circumstances as we become
more sensitive to the possibilities that can be realized in the
varying circumstances in which we and whatever it is we are
trying to understand are placed, (p. 25)
In other words an ontological understanding of experience as‐
sumes a reciprocity between self and other. We feel that it is the con‐
ditions that support the potential inherent in this relationship that
need to be addressed. The task for teacher education then becomes
one of creating spaces where the primary imperative is not to master
technique, plan lessons, or manage students through activities to
achieve “closure”, but to be open to experience, to be “radically un‐
dogmatic” (Gadamer, 1996) so that being mindfully in touch with
self, others and the concrete particulars—the subjects that matter in
our lives—becomes a real possibility. Only then do we feel that the
practice of making good judgments will become what Dewey (1938)
calls a “habit”—that of being attentive to the emergence and devel‐
opment of an experienced self.
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